

## Crises

US sudden, unforeseen pull-out<sup>in</sup> would  
have effect of producing Skybolt-type,  
(Fait accompli) crises for govs that  
have backed US policies, in:

Laos

Thailand

Philis

Japan

Korea

Australia

quite apart from "domino" effect of NVN threat.  
Threat from domestic non-Cons opposition.

Oct?  
Apr? '64

Khrushchev notes

Disting

SEA

Chicom. Split

Yugoslavia, Rumania

Differences for SU:

1. Capital/military vs. consumer

2. Secret police

3. Liberalism; arts

4.

Cyprus

Congo

A

Northoff

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Actions

1. Press speeches

2. RSM answers to queries

3. Mil. readiness

SU

Possible defectors; message? (embassies)

Reaffirm commitments (e.g. test ban)

Increase surveillance, SI (analysis of SI)

Increase flow of info.

Possibilities:

a) We will not know motives, all personnel.

b) Also

c) Reaction in satellites; they may seize moment to revolt.

d) Revolts inside Russia.

~~e) e)~~ e) S-S responses to <sup>545</sup><sub>into</sub> U-2 e.g. Cuba

~~f) f)~~ f) Chinese responses to Sov moves

~~g) g)~~ g) French-British moves; German.

~~h) h)~~ h) SURPRISE (why? Signif?)



We can offer: trade

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Gantloff: 1) Internal domestic factors probably dominant  
(We don't know of major conflict on foreign; K had  
good working on China-SU dispute.)

2) If K was pushing strongly a radical  
change in direction of increased consumer goods, etc.,  
others might have appeared.

3) B-K leadership is what we would have  
expected if K had tried



Mustalt - DE

See Ling and Skjelt

- Was in ~~is~~ the

See Allison: My paper on reactions of countries  
to being bombed

Perceive uncertainty as to B's response to  
your (A) initiatives

- Because of response to "political  
considerations"

- Because there are too many complexities,  
uncertainties, changes, subjective aspects

- Effects of pain on JFK style, performance?

- Aronson guesses on LBJ?

- Mark of anatomism in bureaucracy & politics: not knowing  
why to persuade, and how; disdain for power as persuader,  
compared to intellectual argument.

### Berlin

Collo. account strange: crisis disappears, without S  
asking the question, "Why?" What were K's notions,  
in retrospect? How serious? (How much were Soviets doing,  
besides stating intent; what signals). Impact of Aronson  
program? Berlin TF planning; Berlin Home.

Above all, no mention (like Sov) of end of missile gap  
(or of earlier exchange at Vienna on balance): tit-for-tat speech.

SO expectations on Wall: Why did they think they could  
get away with it? Did WH really take a "grim view" at  
the time? No mention of legal implications, costs, of Wall?

1967  
29 March, 2200

Dear Frank,

### Certain choices have been

Power: Shadow + Substance. The best realists have

been those who place great importance on shadow/size/will for  
and who see <sup>importance of</sup> measures to preserve/build on real "substance".

in terms of effect on rep (rather than ignoring developments

that don't change substance, or that improve substance in worsening rep)

!  
Kessel: Ackman, <sup>even Buller</sup> Buller, Book: early JFK; she is relying

on (recent) substance & allowing rep to dwindle; Morgenthau.



Working at system: close-up, in detail; at process; in retrospect  
with good access;

(11) How badly system worked: <sup>despite "good men"</sup> Missile Wars (though  
<sup>the messes got worse</sup> brilliant resolution); Laos; Cuba; SVN; NATO;  
Missile Crisis (very intricate); <sup>Costs</sup> Low testing; Wall; France; Skybolt  
(Korea: Don Rap, Kowloon, SVN; turned in China;  
Expectations: Berlin; Test Ban; Missile Crisis itself

(Intell failures; yet CIA looks no worse than other  
cognitive functions in govt) (better, in SVN)

Domestically: better on Civil Rights, Economics

But cities; Negro problem; crime

Need to improve the <sup>environment</sup> ~~system~~: incidence of crime  
"miscalculation"

US now preoccupied by crisis / surprise / threatening  
initiatives, just as GVN preoccupied by urban  
riots <sup>(or US budget dominated by SVN)</sup> [Calculate costs, in attention and time & staff  
effort, of clear mistakes by us or avoidable miscalculations  
by others, in terms of effort toward long-run problems,  
new initiatives.] (like McN's problem with Congress, over

B-70: compare to Point-Blank struggle). (+) risks of blow-up  
(or VY-like war)

VFK initial concern with "miscalculation":

Note how many actually occurred (miscalc. of his own  
reactions: Berlin, Steel, Cuba missiles, Laos - Pagan's name; Skybolt misestimated  
4/2 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.9 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.8 4.9 5.0 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.8 5.9 6.0 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.6 6.7 6.8 6.9 7.0 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.6 7.7 7.8 7.9 8.0 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.5 8.6 8.7 8.8 8.9 9.0 9.1 9.2 9.3 9.4 9.5 9.6 9.7 9.8 9.9 10.0 10.1 10.2 10.3 10.4 10.5 10.6 10.7 10.8 10.9 11.0 11.1 11.2 11.3 11.4 11.5 11.6 11.7 11.8 11.9 12.0 12.1 12.2 12.3 12.4 12.5 12.6 12.7 12.8 12.9 13.0 13.1 13.2 13.3 13.4 13.5 13.6 13.7 13.8 13.9 14.0 14.1 14.2 14.3 14.4 14.5 14.6 14.7 14.8 14.9 15.0 15.1 15.2 15.3 15.4 15.5 15.6 15.7 15.8 15.9 16.0 16.1 16.2 16.3 16.4 16.5 16.6 16.7 16.8 16.9 17.0 17.1 17.2 17.3 17.4 17.5 17.6 17.7 17.8 17.9 18.0 18.1 18.2 18.3 18.4 18.5 18.6 18.7 18.8 18.9 19.0 19.1 19.2 19.3 19.4 19.5 19.6 19.7 19.8 19.9 20.0 20.1 20.2 20.3 20.4 20.5 20.6 20.7 20.8 20.9 21.0 21.1 21.2 21.3 21.4 21.5 21.6 21.7 21.8 21.9 22.0 22.1 22.2 22.3 22.4 22.5 22.6 22.7 22.8 22.9 23.0 23.1 23.2 23.3 23.4 23.5 23.6 23.7 23.8 23.9 24.0 24.1 24.2 24.3 24.4 24.5 24.6 24.7 24.8 24.9 25.0 25.1 25.2 25.3 25.4 25.5 25.6 25.7 25.8 25.9 26.0 26.1 26.2 26.3 26.4 26.5 26.6 26.7 26.8 26.9 27.0 27.1 27.2 27.3 27.4 27.5 27.6 27.7 27.8 27.9 28.0 28.1 28.2 28.3 28.4 28.5 28.6 28.7 28.8 28.9 29.0 29.1 29.2 29.3 29.4 29.5 29.6 29.7 29.8 29.9 30.0 30.1 30.2 30.3 30.4 30.5 30.6 30.7 30.8 30.9 31.0 31.1 31.2 31.3 31.4 31.5 31.6 31.7 31.8 31.9 32.0 32.1 32.2 32.3 32.4 32.5 32.6 32.7 32.8 32.9 33.0 33.1 33.2 33.3 33.4 33.5 33.6 33.7 33.8 33.9 34.0 34.1 34.2 34.3 34.4 34.5 34.6 34.7 34.8 34.9 35.0 35.1 35.2 35.3 35.4 35.5 35.6 35.7 35.8 35.9 36.0 36.1 36.2 36.3 36.4 36.5 36.6 36.7 36.8 36.9 37.0 37.1 37.2 37.3 37.4 37.5 37.6 37.7 37.8 37.9 38.0 38.1 38.2 38.3 38.4 38.5 38.6 38.7 38.8 38.9 39.0 39.1 39.2 39.3 39.4 39.5 39.6 39.7 39.8 39.9 40.0 40.1 40.2 40.3 40.4 40.5 40.6 40.7 40.8 40.9 41.0 41.1 41.2 41.3 41.4 41.5 41.6 41.7 41.8 41.9 42.0 42.1 42.2 42.3 42.4 42.5 42.6 42.7 42.8 42.9 43.0 43.1 43.2 43.3 43.4 43.5 43.6 43.7 43.8 43.9 44.0 44.1 44.2 44.3 44.4 44.5 44.6 44.7 44.8 44.9 45.0 45.1 45.2 45.3 45.4 45.5 45.6 45.7 45.8 45.9 46.0 46.1 46.2 46.3 46.4 46.5 46.6 46.7 46.8 46.9 47.0 47.1 47.2 47.3 47.4 47.5 47.6 47.7 47.8 47.9 48.0 48.1 48.2 48.3 48.4 48.5 48.6 48.7 48.8 48.9 49.0 49.1 49.2 49.3 49.4 49.5 49.6 49.7 49.8 49.9 50.0 50.1 50.2 50.3 50.4 50.5 50.6 50.7 50.8 50.9 51.0 51.1 51.2 51.3 51.4 51.5 51.6 51.7 51.8 51.9 52.0 52.1 52.2 52.3 52.4 52.5 52.6 52.7 52.8 52.9 53.0 53.1 53.2 53.3 53.4 53.5 53.6 53.7 53.8 53.9 54.0 54.1 54.2 54.3 54.4 54.5 54.6 54.7 54.8 54.9 55.0 55.1 55.2 55.3 55.4 55.5 55.6 55.7 55.8 55.9 56.0 56.1 56.2 56.3 56.4 56.5 56.6 56.7 56.8 56.9 57.0 57.1 57.2 57.3 57.4 57.5 57.6 57.7 57.8 57.9 58.0 58.1 58.2 58.3 58.4 58.5 58.6 58.7 58.8 58.9 59.0 59.1 59.2 59.3 59.4 59.5 59.6 59.7 59.8 59.9 60.0 60.1 60.2 60.3 60.4 60.5 60.6 60.7 60.8 60.9 61.0 61.1 61.2 61.3 61.4 61.5 61.6 61.7 61.8 61.9 62.0 62.1 62.2 62.3 62.4 62.5 62.6 62.7 62.8 62.9 63.0 63.1 63.2 63.3 63.4 63.5 63.6 63.7 63.8 63.9 64.0 64.1 64.2 64.3 64.4 64.5 64.6 64.7 64.8 64.9 65.0 65.1 65.2 65.3 65.4 65.5 65.6 65.7 65.8 65.9 66.0 66.1 66.2 66.3 66.4 66.5 66.6 66.7 66.8 66.9 67.0 67.1 67.2 67.3 67.4 67.5 67.6 67.7 67.8 67.9 68.0 68.1 68.2 68.3 68.4 68.5 68.6 68.7 68.8 68.9 69.0 69.1 69.2 69.3 69.4 69.5 69.6 69.7 69.8 69.9 70.0 70.1 70.2 70.3 70.4 70.5 70.6 70.7 70.8 70.9 71.0 71.1 71.2 71.3 71.4 71.5 71.6 71.7 71.8 71.9 72.0 72.1 72.2 72.3 72.4 72.5 72.6 72.7 72.8 72.9 73.0 73.1 73.2 73.3 73.4 73.5 73.6 73.7 73.8 73.9 74.0 74.1 74.2 74.3 74.4 74.5 74.6 74.7 74.8 74.9 75.0 75.1 75.2 75.3 75.4 75.5 75.6 75.7 75.8 75.9 76.0 76.1 76.2 76.3 76.4 76.5 76.6 76.7 76.8 76.9 77.0 77.1 77.2 77.3 77.4 77.5 77.6 77.7 77.8 77.9 78.0 78.1 78.2 78.3 78.4 78.5 78.6 78.7 78.8 78.9 79.0 79.1 79.2 79.3 79.4 79.5 79.6 79.7 79.8 79.9 80.0 80.1 80.2 80.3 80.4 80.5 80.6 80.7 80.8 80.9 81.0 81.1 81.2 81.3 81.4 81.5 81.6 81.7 81.8 81.9 82.0 82.1 82.2 82.3 82.4 82.5 82.6 82.7 82.8 82.9 83.0 83.1 83.2 83.3 83.4 83.5 83.6 83.7 83.8 83.9 84.0 84.1 84.2 84.3 84.4 84.5 84.6 84.7 84.8 84.9 85.0 85.1 85.2 85.3 85.4 85.5 85.6 85.7 85.8 85.9 86.0 86.1 86.2 86.3 86.4 86.5 86.6 86.7 86.8 86.9 87.0 87.1 87.2 87.3 87.4 87.5 87.6 87.7 87.8 87.9 88.0 88.1 88.2 88.3 88.4 88.5 88.6 88.7 88.8 88.9 89.0 89.1 89.2 89.3 89.4 89.5 89.6 89.7 89.8 89.9 90.0 90.1 90.2 90.3 90.4 90.5 90.6 90.7 90.8 90.9 91.0 91.1 91.2 91.3 91.4 91.5 91.6 91.7 91.8 91.9 92.0 92.1 92.2 92.3 92.4 92.5 92.6 92.7 92.8 92.9 93.0 93.1 93.2 93.3 93.4 93.5 93.6 93.7 93.8 93.9 94.0 94.1 94.2 94.3 94.4 94.5 94.6 94.7 94.8 94.9 95.0 95.1 95.2 95.3 95.4 95.5 95.6 95.7 95.8 95.9 96.0 96.1 96.2 96.3 96.4 96.5 96.6 96.7 96.8 96.9 97.0 97.1 97.2 97.3 97.4 97.5 97.6 97.7 97.8 97.9 98.0 98.1 98.2 98.3 98.4 98.5 98.6 98.7 98.8 98.9 99.0 99.1 99.2 99.3 99.4 99.5 99.6 99.7 99.8 99.9 100.0 100.1 100.2 100.3 100.4 100.5 100.6 100.7 100.8 100.9 101.0 101.1 101.2 101.3 101.4 101.5 101.6 101.7 101.8 101.9 102.0 102.1 102.2 102.3 102.4 102.5 102.6 102.7 102.8 102.9 103.0 103.1 103.2 103.3 103.4 103.5 103.6 103.7 103.8 103.9 104.0 104.1 104.2 104.3 104.4 104.5 104.6 104.7 104.8 104.9 105.0 105.1 105.2 105.3 105.4 105.5 105.6 105.7 105.8 105.9 106.0 106.1 106.2 106.3 106.4 106.5 106.6 106.7 106.8 106.9 107.0 107.1 107.2 107.3 107.4 107.5 107.6 107.7 107.8 107.9 108.0 108.1 108.2 108.3 108.4 108.5 108.6 108.7 108.8 108.9 109.0 109.1 109.2 109.3 109.4 109.5 109.6 109.7 109.8 109.9 110.0 110.1 110.2 110.3 110.4 110.5 110.6 110.7 110.8 110.9 111.0 111.1 111.2 111.3 111.4 111.5 111.6 111.7 111.8 111.9 112.0 112.1 112.2 112.3 112.4 112.5 112.6 112.7 112.8 112.9 113.0 113.1 113.2 113.3 113.4 113.5 113.6 113.7 113.8 113.9 114.0 114.1 114.2 114.3 114.4 114.5 114.6 114.7 114.8 114.9 115.0 115.1 115.2 115.3 115.4 115.5 115.6 115.7 115.8 115.9 116.0 116.1 116.2 116.3 116.4 116.5 116.6 116.7 116.8 116.9 117.0 117.1 117.2 117.3 117.4 117.5 117.6 117.7 117.8 117.9 118.0 118.1 118.2 118.3 118.4 118.5 118.6 118.7 118.8 118.9 119.0 119.1 119.2 119.3 119.4 119.5 119.6 119.7 119.8 119.9 120.0 120.1 120.2 120.3 120.4 120.5 120.6 120.7 120.8 120.9 121.0 121.1 121.2 121.3 121.4 121.5 121.6 121.7 121.8 121.9 122.0 122.1 122.2 122.3 122.4 122.5 122.6 122.7 122.8 122.9 123.0 123.1 123.2 123.3 123.4 123.5 123.6 123.7 123.8 123.9 124.0 124.1 124.2 124.3 124.4 124.5 124.6 124.7 124.8 124.9 125.0 125.1 125.2 125.3 125.4 125.5 125.6 125.7 125.8 125.9 126.0 126.1 126.2 126.3 126.4 126.5 126.6 126.7 126.8 126.9 127.0 127.1 127.2 127.3 127.4 127.5 127.6 127.7 127.8 127.9 128.0 128.1 128.2 128.3 128.4 128.5 128.6 128.7 128.8 128.9 129.0 129.1 129.2 129.3 129.4 129.5 129.6 129.7 129.8 129.9 130.0 130.1 130.2 130.3 130.4 130.5 130.6 130.7 130.8 130.9 131.0 131.1 131.2 131.3 131.4 131.5 131.6 131.7 131.8 131.9 132.0 132.1 132.2 132.3 132.4 132.5 132.6 132.7 132.8 132.9 133.0 133.1 133.2 133.3 133.4 133.5 133.6 133.7 133.8 133.9 134.0 134.1 134.2 134.3 134.4 134.5 134.6 134.7 134.8 134.9 135.0 135.1 135.2 135.3 135.4 135.5 135.6 135.7 135.8 135.9 136.0 136.1 136.2 136.3 136.4 136.5 136.6 136.7 136.8 136.9 137.0 137.1 137.2 137.3 137.4 137.5 137.6 137.7 137.8 137.9 138.0 138.1 138.2 138.3 138.4 138.5 138.6 138.7 138.8 138.9 139.0 139.1 139.2 139.3 139.4 139.5 139.6 139.7 139.8 139.9 140.0 140.1 140.2 140.3 140.4 140.5 140.6 140.7 140.8 140.9 141.0 141.1 141.2 141.3 141.4 141.5 141.6 141.7 141.8 141.9 142.0 142.1 142.2 142.3 142.4 142.5 142.6 142.7 142.8 142.9 143.0 143.1 143.2 143.3 143.4 143.5 143.6 143.7 143.8 143.9 144.0 144.1 144.2 144.3 144.4 144.5 144.6 144.7 144.8 144.9 145.0 145.1 145.2 145.3 145.4 145.5 145.6 145.7 145.8 145.9 146.0 146.1 146.2 146.3 146.4 146.5 146.6 146.7 146.8 146.9 147.0 147.1 147.2 147.3 147.4 147.5 147.6 147.7 147.8 147.9 148.0 148.1 148.2 148.3 148.4 148.5 148.6 148.7 148.8 148.9 149.0 149.1 149.2 149.3 149.4 149.5 149.6 149.7 149.8 149.9 150.0 150.1 150.2 150.3 150.4 150.5 150.6 150.7 150.8 150.9 151.0 151.1 151.2 151.3 151.4 151.5 151.6 151.7 151.8 151.9 152.0 152.1 152.2 152.3 152.4 152.5 152.6 152.7 152.8 152.9 153.0 153.1 153.2 153.3 153.4 153.5 153.6 153.7 153.8 153.9 154.0 154.1 154.2 154.3 154.4 154.5 154.6 154.7 154.8 154.9 155.0 155.1 155.2 155.3 155.4 155.5 155.6 155.7 155.8 155.9 156.0 156.1 156.2 156.3 156.4 156.5 156.6 156.7 156.8 156.9 157.0 157.1 157.2 157.3 157.4 157.5 157.6 157.7 157.8 157.9 158.0 158.1 158.2 158.3 158.4 158.5 158.6 158.7 158.8 158.9 159.0 159.1 159.2 159.3 159.4 159.5 159.6 159.7 159.8 159.9 160.0 160.1 160.2 160.3 160.4 160.5 160.6 160.7 160.8 160.9 161.0 161.1 161.2 161.3 161.4 161.5 161.6 161.7 161.8 161.9 162.0 162.1 162.2 162.3 162.4 162.5 162.6 162.7 162.8 162.9 163.0 163.1 163.2 163.3 163.4 163.5 163.6 163.7 163.8 163.9 164.0 164.1 164.2 164.3 164.4 164.5 164.6 164.7 164.8 164.9 165.0 165.1 165.2 165.3 165.4 165.5 165.6 165.7 165.8 165.9 166.0 166.1 166.2 166.3 166.4 166.5 166.6 166.7 166.8 166.9 167.0 167.1 167.2 167.3 167.4 167.5 167.6 167.7 167.8 167.9 168.0 168.1 168.2 168.3 168.4 168.5 168.6 168.7 168.8 168.9 169.0 169.1 169.2 169.3 169.4 169.5 169.6 169.7 169.8 169.9 170.0 170.1 170.2 170.3 170.4 170.5 170.6 170.7 170.8 170.9 171.0 171.1 171.2 171.3 171.4 171.5 171.6 171.7 171.8 171.9 172.0 172.1 172.2 172.3 172.4 172.5 172.6 172.7 172.8 172.9 173.0 173.1 173.2 173.3 173.4 173.5 173.6 173.7 173.8 173.9 174.0 174.1 174.2 174.3 174.4 174.5 174.6 174.7 174.8 174.9 175.0 175.1 175.2 175.3 175.4 175.5 175.6 175.7 175.8 175.9 176.0 176.1 176.2 176.3 176.4 176.5 176.6 176.7 176.8 176.9 177.0 177.1 177.2 177.3 177.4 177.5 177.6 177.7 177.8 177.9 178.0 178.1 178.2 178.3 178.4 178.5 178.6 178.7 178.8 178.9 179.0 179.1 179.2 179.3 179.4 179.5 179.6 179.7 179.8 179.9 180.0 180.1 180.2 180.3 180.4 180.5 180.6 180.7 180.8 180.9 181.0 181.1 181.2 181.3 181.4 181.5 181.6 181.7 181.8 181.9 182.0 182.1 182.2 182.3 182.4 182.5 182.6 182.7 182.8 182.9 183.0 183.1 183.2 183.3 183.4 183.5 183.6 183.7 183.8 183.9 184.0 184.1 184.2 184.3 184.4 184.5 184.6 184.7 184.8 184.9 185.0 185.1 185.2 185.3 185.4 185.5 185.6 185.7 185.8 185.9 186.0 186.1 186.2 186.3 186.4 186.5 186.6 186.7 186.8 186.9 187.0 187.1 187.2 187.3 187.4 187.5 187.6 187.7 187.8 187.9 188.0 188.1 188.2 188.3 188.4 188.5 188.6 188.7 188.8 188.9 189.0 189.1 189.2 189.3 189.4 189.5 189.6 189.7 189.8 189.9 190.0 190.1 190.2 190.3 190.4 190.5 190.6 190.7 190.8 190.9 191.0 191.1 191.2 191.3 191.4 191.5 191.6 191.7 191.8 191.9 192.0 192.1 192.2 192.3 192.4 192.5 192.6 192.7 192.8 192.9 193.0 193.1 193.2 193.3 193.4 193.5 193.6 193.7 193.8 193.9 194.0 194.1 194.2 194.3 194.4 194.5 194.6 194.7 194.8 194.9 195.0 195.1 195.2 195.3 195.4 195.5 195.6 195.7 195.8 195.9 196.0 196.1 196.2 196.3 196.4 196.5 196.6 196.7 196.8 196.9 197.0 197.1 197.2 197.3 197.4 197.5 197.6 197.7 197.8 197.9 198.0 198.1 198.2 198.3 198.4 198.5 198.6 198.7 198.8 198.9 199.0 199.1 199.2 199.3 199.4 199.5 199.6 199.7 199.8 199.9 200.0 200.1 200.2 200.3 200.4 200.5 200.6 200.7 200.8 200.9 201.0 201.1 201.2 201.3 201.4 201.5 201.6 201.7 201.8 201.9 202.0 202.1 202.2 202.3 202.4 202.5 202.6 202.7 202.8 202.9 203.0 203.1 203.2 203.3 203.4 203.5 203.6 203.7 203.8 203.9 204.0 204.1 204.2 204.3 204.4 204.5 204.6 204.7 204.8 204.9 205.0 205.1 205.2 205.3 205.4 205.5 205.6 205.7 205.8 205.9 206.0 206.1 206.2 206.3 206.4 206.5 206.6 206.7 206.8 206.9 207.0 207.1 207.2 207.3 207.4 207.5 207.6 207.7 207.8 207.9 208.0 208.1 208.2 208.3 208.4 208.5 208.6 208.7 208.8 208.9 209.0 209.1 209.2 209.3 209.4 209.5 209.6 209.7 209.8 209.9 210.0 210.1 210.2 210.3 210.4 210.5 210.6 210.7 210.8 210.9 211.0 211.1 211.2 211.3 211.4 211.5 211.6 211.7 211.8 211.9 212.0 212.1 212.2 212.3 212.4 212.5 212.6 212.7 212.8 212.9 213.0 213.1 213.2 213.3 213.4 213.5 213.



29 March 1967

~~Dear President,~~

Themes to comment on from Lovenson/Schlesinger:

1) CIA in Bay of Pigs <sup>+ Laos</sup> and SVN: <sup>Adams</sup> 532

(CIA shortcomings; Phillips thesis)

2) Berlin crisis — puzzle of resolution; what it led to. <sup>Reluctance of</sup>

3) Missile gap ending: effects (Vienna, Berlin, <sup>C. 99</sup> K. McPatric, ...  
Civil Defense

4) Shadow + substance of power; Bay of Pigs; Wendeberg; Berlin;  
482; 483

Cuba (Turkey). Concern for "dissolution."

5) Steel crisis — Missile crisis

(Compare Comm. still in  
closing out a crisis: Remay

6) Missile crisis:

— Secrecy

— role of consultants

— to intent; expectations (election)

— Shootdowns + ultimatum; Cuban control

— Turkish ICBMs incident

7) Untold: change of war plans;  
Pres CFC 1962 fully

<sup>501</sup> JFK attitudes on troops in  
Cuba; helping French; NATO impact

8) SVN: nature for commitment

(thousands landing Laos, Cuba, Berlin,  
SVN, Cuba — Wendeberg, finally SVN

9) Compare doubts in JFK (with SV):  
— nuclear,

demonstration of the cost of  
pursuing "prestige" — when  
bluff is called.

10) List of areas without: infiltration

Remay

## Crisis

Hyp: I perception of a very ambiguous situation  
as unambiguous, calling for strong, risky,  
irreversible action, suggests either

(1) desire/need to perceive it that way  
[or, to perceive it as unambiguous?]

and/or (2) desire/need — pushed for other, or  
complex, or unconscious reasons — to take

→ that action

[or, 'some strong action' ?]

E.g. (1) Interpretation of Sov motives in Cold War

(e.g. in Greece) (or, w.r.t. Hungary)

(2) Bomber/missile gaps

(3) ABM gap

(4) Second Jordan Gulf incident.

(5) Interp. of Chilean motives?

## Crisis

What happens to proposals for:

(1) threats, to precede actions?

[ (2) before Hiroshima

(b) before bombing of NVN

(c) before Dien Bien Phu

[Cont: Cuba II]

What happens to : proposals to negot

(b) Then at onset of bombing NVN.



What if: Plehke had not come, during Korygin  
visit: and

(a) SU had made clear its intent to support  
but (b) had proposed temporary negot plan interim

Did VC turn the attack deliberately?

(Or, to coincide with McG visit?)

Why Plehke?

What was Korygin reaction? How was  
SU policy affected?

Why Qui Nam?

(Harold Wilson; James)

Did we foresee UK support? Lack of pressure for  
negate?



## Crisis

Westy saw VN as a slow crisis from 1964

on: - US troops were required to save VN

- VN must be saved

- It would take time to bring in US troops:

must start as soon as possible

(NVA troops would have been perfect expense; but  
<sup>Westy!</sup>  
we didn't know of these soon enough.)

(Westy wasn't looking for expense then.)

Westy was betrayed by his J-2: reflexes  
from Harkins' era!)

Is led to point to (small) Com successes of spring '6  
and ride on the commitments ravined by the bombing.

Write: is this a success or a failure for  
US

Time for a change"

"He lost China!"

Li: Series of mistakes lost him ability to build support, protect his power.

Precipitating incident: speech on reallocation.

Li: maybe they didn't want to give him chance to consolidate his position on celebration of coronation

Li: His crises have come when he was out of  
control  
Li: 1957, lost April, Yangtze River.

Li: His "wrong" approach



Does

Risk doesn't that we should speculate

(How will they react to Chinese nuclear explosion?)

Som: They may accept Chinese bid to a summit on  
disarmament.

Does

(Continuation of

Cuban files



## Correspondence

1.

1. Did B + K have access to letters?

Thompson: Bob had said they didn't <sup>3</sup>: only K, Hughes,

...

(others: can't believe that. T: can't assume they did know.) But they have access now.

T: correspondence has been moribund for some time;  
no need to resume before election.

T: I've straddled the issue of demigod vs. glider  
party vs. bureaucrat: one of each. But this can't go on; under the  
I would put my money on Podgorny to be the  
new Khrushchev; the only one who is the K type.



T: Watch out not to provide incidents, provocations.

Don't go closer than ... 20 miles, etc.

(Pulled thruster back; called off flight. [Crew

Customs video? 304?

T: They're going to wait for our election in my view.

They will want to keep things on dead center.

T: We might merge them on Indonesia - Malaysia.

T: They will also want to wait and see how weak the

British nation now is.

Horlick 1500 16 Oct

Nepotism

Cult of personality

personal diplomacy

Adzhubee's visit to Germany

(Will visit to West Germany be  
picked up by Kossygin?)

"There are some comrades who say I shouldn't

They have presented K with a fait accompli.  
Was meeting a full meeting of the Central  
Committee — did they fly in members from all —  
give K a chance to marshal support

+

did Ambassadors come in? (I hope

Pravda edit; no policy issues mentioned

Free-wheeling

have. Unusual schemes

Not taking into account achievements of science &  
technology

Nepotism

See article by Talensky in Int. Affairs #10, 1964  
on ABM (Deployment by peace-loving  
gov is not destabilizing). Problem for SU.

Tal. has taken L, non-military position

▲ ▲ ▲

Vague commitment to deStalinization

Not until about 1961 that K<sup>L</sup> was described  
as C/NC, by Malinovsky; not in Const.

Const: Presidium

Malinovsky now in control of the armed forces than  
before; but prob. Brezhnev in charge. Decisions  
by majority vote of the Presidium.



Horchel

G Brezhnev senior partner.

Leaders don't want to give all power  
to one man; split

[Joint US-Cuba initiative on non-proliferation  
Present rules not to assist others] □

Howard Smeader, UCLA: look on

The Politics of Succession (in USSR)

(FROG & SCUD months prob. held by all ~~states~~  
East Eur armies except Albania & Yugoslavia

Nov '64

## Crisis Talk

### 1. Role of preconceptions

(prior probs, hypotheses...

acts, relevant states, values,

info sources, L.O.; prior probs)

Effect on "inference",

reflection.

### 2. Relevance of formal models

of decision; - evidence

## UCCA Talk

### 1. Tension

2. Presumption: focus: attention

3.

## Cuban II Crisis

I did not know:

(i) Turkish missiles were removed by JFK.  
and SU was told; but this was in  
context of ultimatum!

Moreover, message to NATO did was not  
delivered [because of ultimatum? Waiting for  
reply? Ask Nitzze.] yet decision was  
made, and ours were told!



Here, had to follow Reagan / sworn kind of track  
(Emitt Hughes, 2 Oct 67) advice: "Pick <sup>Decide what</sup> ~~places~~  
not to save ...." "Costs doubt on our  
(and?) determination to stop Communism; a unilateral  
resolution that is real basis not only of faith in  
our treaties but in our continued help even without  
treaty: i.e. SVN." I.e. Free World relies on  
US internal (Resolve) to oppose & stop Communism  
everywhere: more than on our Word, & whether or  
not Word has really been given.

SVN put in properly worldwide faith in our  
"Compulsion to Oppose" Communism, not in reliability  
of our Promise to Help an ally.

"Losing" a country to Communism (and in  
this setting, every shift is regarded by others—and  
believed by them to be regarded by US—as a  
US "loss") this always generates <sup>US</sup> will & ability;  
hence, if a commitment is needed to prevent "loss"  
ask for us to withhold it. We end up pledged  
to oppose worldwide not only "aggression" but  
any shift to or even towards (Dem/Rep) Communism  
(i.e., opposition to elections in SVN; Thailand?)

## Crisis + Commitments

[ Can't just say, Weakness (Loss, Ego of Pigs,  
1961) → independent commitments (+ every boldness)  
→ crisis/crisis. (SVN; Cuba II). <sup>Admitted...</sup> (Munich → Polish  
monsters, Cuban threat → War); Withdrawal from Korea → Korea  
as if Fairness/commitment always led to Peace.  
Tough: Cuba II <sup>Berlin</sup> → Peace  
Quincy II + II → Peace ]

Costs/pinks of commitments Korea → Taiwan, SVN (Korea 1967)  
Also commitment/toughness can lead to other, less  
founded commitment; → eventually to temptation or  
frustration of an effort → war.

1) Need to establish rationale for our  
commitment, gain broad support, may make it difficult  
to make other commitments, or to draw back from  
loaded or rash commitments; or to make desirable  
adjustments. 2) And success can lead to over-confidence,  
and over reliance on threats. 3) Commitment by US  
to make effort by ally look unnecessary or  
undesired (ARVN; NATO allies) → their contribution  
(and the security and domestic solutions, budget)  
address → determine things more + more critically on US  
action → great apprehension over any acts that symbolically  
betray US will: e.g. fail to make new commitments  
that show inability to come to Korean for other... (1967)



For the President: the Crisis is the Pay-off

Crisis are the Health of the Presidency

[ On: Humiliation and the Web of Crisis

<sup>in</sup> Tempers: Chinese Humiliation during 1850-1920 as root of nationalism. (Cf. Black Nationalism) VN.

Presidents: Suez, U-2, Cuba I, Cuba II, Laos, Wall

Crisis = public decision-making, with high humiliation - potential. Hence, it is past crises that form a major context for current/present crises (in minds of (a) public, and (b) bureaucracy). Crisis is Presidential decision-making; his own preferences/etc. are revealed more to bureaucracy - even more than to public - in crisis than usual; <sup>with</sup> more public attention. Thus, past crisis-infir attitudes/decisions determine how current decisions will be interpreted; past crises supply the hypotheses and prior probs, for drawing inferences (e.g., "NFC is a quitter...")

Crisis are the Tests, the Experiments, the Sample-point observations on the President.

On: "people" (public, bureaucracy, allies, enemies) have theories of "Pres/US behavior in crises" (i.e., policy, and/or crises), which they test, apply, modify in new crises: for this, Crises (or a sub-set) are the sample space: Pres must refer to this space if he is to act in a rational manner. The Crisis, the Test, the Pay-off.

Introduces: 1) discrimination, freedom in making  
commitments; 2) insistence / leverage to force Allied  
efforts, not swept over-reliance on US; 3)  
discrimination in breaking, avoiding commitments: conscious  
of costs - pressures to make new ones elsewhere.

(avoiding <sup>new</sup> commitment - as Bay, Laos - taken  
as underlining faith in old commitments - Berlin, SVN,  
Thailand - requiring other new ones to restore.)

Bay of Pigs

Failure can lead to avoidance of new  
commitments (Bay of Pigs - Laos; SVN now → Congo  
now) (Bay → limits on SVN, fall '61)

By Fall 1961, JFK Admin was committed -  
Prone (esp. in Far East) yet, for SVN and SEA,  
Troop-ly. A need to make at least a  
symbolic commitment - yet skepticism and  
reluctance to insert troops.

[Note: case made by Taylor for troops - 1961 - my  
like. Also B case for bombing North, in Feb 1965: latter  
case urgent, action more radical: yet LBJ took latter, JFK  
did not.]



## Crisis

(What makes so many convergences "disparate" to Pres — since multiple crises — since distracts attention from other measures, problems and multiple violent "solutions")?

(a) Domestic political convergences

(b) Alliance politics.

Consider why these: (1) are taken so seriously by Pres

(2) Why the convergences impend, etc.

(e.g. use of deception, secrecy, "position")

## Postow July '65 Contingency Planning

[A reason for distrust: A plan that is done

- a) quickly, but non-urgently
- b) by low-level staff
- c) long before the event
- d) [on single-agency basis]

is unlikely to correspond to the plan that would emerge close to the event, with:

- a) high-level participation; interagency
- b) urgent focus of attention
- c) current details.

Hence: 1) "wanted" TBR

2) if irrevocable decisions made, alternatives excluded, regrettable loss of flexibility; capability.

3) may focus expectations so as to cause surprise; fix reflexes so as to slow response.

Rostow 1 July '65 Contingency Planning

[A reason for distrust: A plan that is done

- 2) quickly, but non-urgently
- 3) by low-level staff
- 4) long before the event
- 5) [on single-agency basis]

is unlikely to correspond to the plan that would emerge close to the event, with:

- 2) high-level participation; interagency
- 3) urgent focus of attention
- 4) current details.

Hence: 1) "wasted" time

2) if irrevocable decisions made, alternatives excluded, regrettable loss of flexibility, capability.

3) may focus expectations so as to cause surprise; fix reflexes so as to slow response.

[ Anti-crisis planning :

1) planning, or

2) crisis-like activity

to prevent a specific, identifiable crisis.

(Jordan waters; ?

Komer: "Systematic [explicit extended form] analysis of the problem almost nil"

"systematic planning of the preventive phase of problems we can all see coming down the pike.

e.g. how to get through the Jordan waters disputes without an Arab-Israeli dispute.

Thompson: Study what could have been done to prevent crises, avoid them?

(Skylott



Hidden Crisis

14/18322 recd 14/1445 Wash

Opfer (border crosser in Stanleyville)

to Rakey CINC in Pambis:

Have received tel from Bumba. 5 American planes  
have landed. Request you authorize me to kill  
all Americans who are in the liberated zone. Awaiting  
your answer.

("We got a message we wish we hadn't gotten.")

Oct<sup>7</sup> 1964

Brauer; Hankins; Cooper;

Every Commander expected to be stopped  
before they started; never imagined they might  
be stopped in middle.

(Brauer: thinks Paris/London leaders did that  
this, after start, though commanders didn't know it,

Cooper: Strong concern that operation be short  
as possible, because of UN reaction.

[Didn't foresee US pressure?] Big on

limits of Presidential Power — and Patience

Show cases where Pres is pressed along  
policy lines where he doesn't really believe:

(MCT, conventional strategy, no aid to French; CB)  
on Berlin; Bay of Pigs) and how this snaps in a crisis,  
or limit. (Opponent, knowing Pres may not believe what  
he says, "helps" him with fait accompli; or fails to believe.

Or Pres is unable to get what he wants:

He: Korean (China?) troop reduction

JFK: Turkish (KEM) ant (Crisis, and after-Crisis.)

- JFK failure to control the MCF cabal.

[Is the LB offer of a billion dollars to  
SVN/NVN <sup>after the war</sup> good if NVN wins?]

Committee                      Dim  
Note: US response to "request" — that had been  
drafted by USG.

[Compare recommendations/recommendations in Taylor  
Report with Ct/Kalpakovic.]

How big a change was perceived by Washington?

(Clear breach of Geneva)

Why urgent? VC? or internal weaknesses,  
requiring success against VC (better not urgent  
in itself?) ?

Compare two Jordan reports.



